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Abstract
In this paper, we address the incentives to invest in environmental
innovation of enterprises that exercise market power in the output
market and also buy and sell pollution permits. Di¤erently from the
existing literature, using a market approach we explicitly model the
interaction between the output market, where rms play à la Cournot,
and the permits market. We nd that, in the new equilibrium rms
behave symmetrically, that is, they either both innovate to protect
their market share in the output market or they both choose not to
innovate. Whether the innovation equilibrium arises or not depends
on the output demand and on the productivity enhancement and not
on the distribution of permits among rms. Finally, we show that,
under this market conguration, collusion can be welfare enhancing.
KeyWords: environmental innovation, tradable permits, interaction
à la Cournot.
JEL Classication: D43, L13, Q55
CORE, Universite Catholique de Louvain, Chair Lhoist Berghmans in Environmental
Economics and Management.
Email: sanin@core.ucl.ac.be
yCORE, Universite Catholique de Louvain and Università di Siena
Email: skerdilajda.zanaj@uclouvain.be
We wish to thank Thierry Bréchet, Jean J. Gabszewicz, Marco Marinucci and all the
attendants to the Environmental Workshops for their stimulating comments. The usual
disclaim applies
1
1 Introduction
In this paper, we address the incentives to invest in environmental innovation
of enterprises that exert market power in the output market. These rms
also buy and sell pollution permits. Many papers have drawn their attention
to the incentives of rms to invest in less pollutant technologies but only
Montero (2002) has taken into account strategic interaction in the output
market. A major outcome of the previous paper is that incentives to innovate
depend on the decrease in permits price due to investment in R&D1. On the
contrary, we show that innovation can determine an increase in permitsprice,
leading to a higher cost of output production. This result is derived using
a market approach to model the permits market, rather than a bargaining
process.
Moreover, most of the literature regarding market power, claims that the
allocation of permits among rms has important e¢ ciency implications. Our
main contribution in this regard is that, under Cournot competition, the
allocation of permits among rms has no e¤ect neither on e¢ ciency nor on
incentives to innovate. In this strategic context, it is shown that innovation
incentives mainly depend on output demand and productivity enhancement
resulting from technological improvement.
As Montero (2002), most of the papers in this area are devoted to the
comparison of the incentives to innovate under alternative pollution control
rules. To do so, in general, the interaction between the pollution market and
the output market is neglected, or only a single monopoly rm is considered
in the output market. This is the case in Wenders (1975), Tietenberg (1985),
Downing and White (1986) and Milliman and Prince (1989) who show that
market-based instruments such as tradeable permits provide more incentives
to environmental innovation than command-and-control instruments. More
recently, other authors, pursuing the same objective, introduce explicitly the
output market, but most of them consider it as a competitive one (Requate
(1995) and Parry (1998)). Most of these papers represents environmental
innovation as an R&D sector which produces a (proportional) decrease in
the cost of abatement per unit of R&D investment.
1In Montero (2002) innovation produces a decrease in permits price that has, on one
hand, a direct e¤ect on the innovator prots (positive or negative depending on whether
the rms is a buyer or a seller of permits) and, through a decrease in cost of production,
allows the innovators rival to increase output. The incentives to innovate then depend on
the net e¤ect and the e¤ect of the decrease in cost of abatement on the investors prot.
2
In contrast with this previous literature, we adopt a di¤erent denition
of environmental innovation. We account for innovation that, instead of
simply reducing the marginal cost of abatement2, produces a change in the
intensity of emissions per unit of input used in production, like in Bréchet
and Jouvet (2006). This general specication is particularly relevant in the
case of some pollutants like C02 where for many sectors reducing emissions
requires changing the production process itself3, and not just investing in
some end of pipe technology.
We develop a model of two rms that compete à la Cournot in the output
market. The decision to innovate is modelled as a sequential game, whose
payo¤s are composed both from the revenue of the output market and from
the revenue or cost from the market for permits. Firmsinteraction in the
output market gives birth to the demand and the supply of permits in the
permits market. Firms receive for free an amount of pollution permits that
can be di¤erent from the optimal amount of permits needed to produce the
output. Accordingly, the "extra" permits of one rm become the supply of
permits; and the "shortage" of permits of the other constitutes the demand
of permits. In the output market, the price of permits is taken as given,
and therefore, the optimal quantities of permits are chosen as a function of
their price. This structure reminds the "technology-linked" markets setup
proposed by Gabszewicz and Zanaj (2006b). However, there is an important
di¤erence between the latter and the present one: in this paper the same
rms play both in the output market and in the market for permits. Our
innovation game is also reminiscent of the one in Gabszewicz and Garella
(1995). The decision to innovate or not is similar to the choice whether or
not to internalize production of an intermediate good in the latter paper.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model, the
game and the equilibrium analysis, Section 3 discusses welfare e¢ ciency and
allocation of permits while Section 4 concludes.
2This way of modeling environmental innovation is generally inspired on the char-
acteristics of SO2 markets where emissions can be reduced by investing in end of pipe
technologies:
3Many electricity plants switch to Integrated Gasication Combined Cycle (IGCC) coal
generation as they are capable of separating and capturing C02 emissions at a lower cost
than conventional coal combustion power plants. For more details on technical issues see
Stephens and van der Zwaan (2005).
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2 The model
Assume there are two symmetric rms that produce an homogeneous good
y using the same technology4
y = x: (1)
Input x is a polluting good. For each rm, emissions e from the use of
input x are given by the technology
e =
1
k
x: (2)
Hence, technology of producing output y in terms of emissions can be
expressed by simply substituting (2) in (1)
y = ke: (3)
In order to comply with the environmental regulation, each rms must
hold one pollution permit for each emission unit. This is what will be call
the "full compliance assumption" and allows this paper to talk indistinctly
about optimal level of emissions or optimal level of permits used.
Firms face a linear demand for their output, p = 1 y; and they compete
à la Cournot in the output market. They are assigned for free an amount
of permits  and (1   ) respectively, of the total amount of permits S: As
long as the amount of permits is assigned equally, there is no exchange of
permits. Instead, if rms receive di¤erent amount of permits, i.e.,  6= 1
2
;
then a market for permits arises. The rm getting a higher number of permits
may become the seller of permits, while the rm receiving the smaller share
may become the buyer of permits. Our full compliance assumption makes
permits a necessary input in this polluting industry.
Firms have the possibility to invest in environmental innovation or bet-
ter to adopt a new technology that is characterized by a lower pollution
intensity. Given our interest in markets where the rms emit CO2 to the
atmosphere, we characterize the technology change as Hicks-neutral: envi-
ronmental innovation is a change in the coe¢ cient of emissionstechnology
4Note that the linear technology that uses only one factor of production is a Cobb-
Douglas with a xed factor.
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from k to ~k where ~k > k; consequently, the marginal productivity of emis-
sions increases5. Since we want to highlight the e¤ects of strategic interaction
in the innovation decision, we assume that the cost of innovation is the same
for both rms, and equal to zero for simplicity. The restrictions ~k < 2k and
2
3
> S~k > ~k k
2~k k are imposed throughout the model to guarantee that both
rms make non negative prots for all outcomes6. Notice that the domain
f; k; Sg satisfying these restrictions is non empty7.
2.1 The game
Before playing, each rm knows the total amount of permits available S
and the proportion  and (1 ) that each of them will get. The innovation
game is modelled as a sequential game. Stage one consists of the simultaneous
choice whether to invest in innovation or not. In stage two, rmsstrategies
are output quantities, yA and yB respectively, and they are assumed to play
Cournot. Accordingly, payo¤s in the second stage game obtain as follows:
A
 
yA; yB

= (1  yA   yB)yA   q(eA   S);
B
 
yA; yB

= (1  yA   yB)yB   q(eB   (1  )S):
where q is the price of permits, and eA and eB are the amount of emissions
emitted by rm A and rm B, respectively.
Denote by (Non innov, Non innov), and call outcome (1) the rst-stage
choice in which none of the rms chooses to innovate. The payo¤ pair in this
outcome is
 
A1 ; 
B
1

: Similarly, for the other three outcomes of the rst-stage
game. When rms have to play the rst stage game, i.e., the innovation game,
under the assumption that their behavior satises the criterion of subgame
perfection, they consider the matrix game depicted below:
5A well-known example where innovation is modelled in the same way can be found in
Sharon, Oster (1982).
6Firstly, note that the condition
~k
k  2 is necesary for the existence of equilibrium in the
permits market. This conditions yields a positively sloped supply of permits coming from
the rm receiving   12 permits. Secondly, equilibrium price of permits is nonnegative
if ~kS 6 23 while equilibrium levels of emissions is nonnegative if S~k >
~k k
2~k k .
7For instance, the set of values  = 0:5; S = 0:5; k = 1 and ~k = 1:3 satises the required
system of inequalities.
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B (4)
Non innov Innovate
A Non innovInnovate
1 :
 
A1 ; 
B
1

4 : (A4 ; 
B
4 )
3 : (A3 ; 
B
3 ) 2 : (
A
2 ; 
B
2 )
The equilibrium of the game depends on the di¤erence, for each agent, in
the payo¤ coming both from outputsand permitsmarkets. The subgame
perfect Nash equilibria of the two-stage game are identied through backward
induction.
2.2 Second-stage game
2.2.1 Outcome (1): no rm innovates
Output market equilibrium
When no rm innovates, taking into account equation (3), total payo¤
A of rm A obtains
A(eA; eB) = (1  keA   keB)keA   q(eA   S): (5)
If the amount of permits  assigned to rm A is  > 1
2
; then S   eA
represents the supply of permits. Similarly, the total payo¤ of rm B is:
B(eA; eB) = (1  keA   keB)keB   q(eB   (1  )S): (6)
Standard computations of Cournot equilibrium give the optimal quantity
of emissions chosen by each rm:
eA1 (q) = e
B
1 (q) =
k   q
32k2
: (7)
Permitsmarket equilibrium
Since rms are symmetric, their optimal level of emissions is the same.
Consequently, each rm becomes either a buyer or a seller of permits de-
pending on the amount of permits received (S or (1  )S respectively) as
compared with expression (7).
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The demand D and supply O of permits are indirectly dened in the
optimal decision of the rm in the output market. If  > 1
2
, rm A is the
supplier of permits and supply is:
O = S   k   q
32k2
:
Analogously, we get the demand of permits as:
D =
k   q
32k2
  (1  )S:
Then, from the equilibrium condition O = D in the market for permits,
the permits price q1 that clears the market for the entire quantity S obtains
as:
q1 = k(1 
3
2
kS): (8)
Hence, substituting (8) in (7),
eA1 =
S
2
= eB1 (9)
Substituting the optimal level of emissions in the production function (3)
we nd the optimal level of output for each enterprise:
yA1 = k
S
2
= yB1 (10)
2.2.2 Outcome (2): both rms innovate
Outcome (2) of the second stage game is analogous to outcome (1): rms use
the same improved environmental-e¢ cient technology. Production of each
rm is now respectively yA = ~keA and yB = ~keB where ~k > k: Therefore,
for a given amount of emissions, a higher level of production can be obtained.
Following the procedure in the previous section, we nd the equilibrium
price in the market of permits q2 when both rms innovate as
q2 = ~k(1 
3
2
~kS): (11)
It follows,
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Lemma 1 The permitsprice q2 when both rms innovate is higher (lower)
than the permits price q1 when none of the rms innovate if the productivity
improvement is lower (higher) than a threshold value.
Proof. See Appendix.
The above lemma claims that, given the exogenous variables f; k; Sg ;
there is a set of productivity improvement values ~k
k
for which innovation
makes the permits price increase. This result is new for the literature con-
cerning pollution permits. The importance of this result is clear as permits
price represent the cost of producing output y having a direct impact on
incentives to innovate.
By symmetry, the optimal emissions eA2 and e
B
2 when both rms innovate
is equal to
eA2 =
S
2
= eB2 : (12)
Hence, the optimal output for each enterprise is higher than output in
outcome (1) and is equal to
yA2 = ~k
S
2
= yB2 : (13)
2.2.3 Outcome (3): only agent A innovates
Output market equilibrium
When only one rm innovates competition is no longer dened as a sym-
metric Cournot. Instead, the enterprise that innovates is more e¢ cient hav-
ing a lower unit cost of production. If, in this case, rm A is the one inno-
vating, it maximizes
A(eA; eB) = (1  ~keA   keB)~keA   q(eA   S): (14)
Similarly, the total payo¤ of the rm that does not innovate, in this case
rm B, is
B(eA; eB) = (1  ~keA   keB)keB   q(eB   (1  )S): (15)
Di¤erentiating A and B; respectively, with respect to eA and eB and
solving the resulting system, we nd the optimal emission for each agent as
a function of permitsprice, namely,
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eA3 (q) =

~k   2k

q + ~kk
3~k2k2
(16)
eB3 (q) =

k   2~k

q + ~kk
3~kk22
: (17)
Permitsmarket equilibrium
As before, comparing the optimal level of emissions in (16) and (17) with
the amount of permits assigned to each rm, each rm is either a buyer or
a seller. This determines the equilibrium price in the market for permits.
Therefore from the equilibrium condition8,
S  
~kq   2kq + ~kk
3~k2k2
=
kq   2~kq + ~kk
3~kk22
  (1  )S
the equilibrium permit price is:
q3 =
1
2
~kk(~k + k   3k~kS)
~k2   ~kk + k2
 (18)
Substituting (18) in (16) and (17) we get the optimal level of emissions
both for agent A who innovated and for agent B:
eA3 =
~k   k   ~kkS + 2k2S
2(~k2   ~kk + k2) (19)
eB3 =
k   ~k   ~kkS + 2~k2S
2

~k2   ~kk + k2
 (20)
8The best response function of agent A; eA3 ; is a function of e
B
3 and q; but e
B
3 itself
is a function of q. Hence, the e¤ect of the price of permits q on eA3 passes through two
channels: a direct one, found in the best response function of agent A, and an indirect
one, coming from the e¤ect of q on Bs best response function eA3 (e
B
3 (q)): If ~k > 2k; the
indirect e¤ect overcomes the direct e¤ect, or said di¤erently, the substitution strategic
e¤ect intrinsic in the Cournot game overcomes the direct e¤ect of the permits price q.
To have a meaningful interaction and the existence of permits market we need the direct
e¤ect to be the prelavent one
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Then, substituting the optimal level of emissions in the production func-
tion we nd the optimal level of output for each agent:
yA3 = ~k
~k   k   ~kkS + 2k2S
2(~k2   ~kk + k2) (21)
yB3 = k
k   ~k   ~kkS + 2~k2S
2

~k2   ~kk + k2
 (22)
2.2.4 Outcome (4): only agent B innovates
Outcome (4) is analogous to outcome (3) but rm B is the one innovating
instead of rm A. This means that, in the output market, rm B(A) will
behave in outcome (4) as rm A(B) behaved in outcome (3). Notice that,
as total emissions at equilibrium are always exactly equal to S, the fact that
only one agent innovates already implies that part of the polluting input is
being used more e¢ ciently from an environmental point of view, leading to
a higher level of output for the same overall level of emissions S:
Accordingly, taking into account the fact that when both agents simul-
taneously, innovate, total output increases (see (10) (13)), we can state the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 If at least one rm innovates, total output supplied increases,
compared with the output level when no rm innovates.
Proof. See Appendix.
Moreover,
Proposition 3 The price of permits is independent from the allocation of
permits ; in all outcomes of the game.
Proof. Simple observation of equations (8),(11) and (18).
The relevance of permits allocation among agents in terms of price e¢ -
ciency (i.e. in terms of the monetary burden of pollution control) was studied
by Hahn (1984). In this paper, since the dominant rm acts as a monop-
olist (monopsonist) in order to rise (or depress) permits price, the amount
of permits allocated to the dominant determines its position on the permits
market and therefore permits price e¢ ciency. In the same line Eshel (2005)
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nds that  determines the degree of market power of the dominant rm
in the permits market and it can "balance" its market power in the output
market9. Under perfect competition in the output market, the relevance of
 is even greater as the amount of permits received is the only opportunity
for positive prots.
Instead, we model output market interaction introducing competition à
la Cournot. This changes the role of permits allocation even in the case
of asymmetric Cournot competition: giving to the most e¢ cient agent (or
we could say the "dominant " rm in the output market) the exact amount
of permits needed for production does not change the price of permits (or
unit cost of input)10. Then, in our model the value of  has no e¢ ciency
implications.
2.3 First-stage game
In this section, rms consider the matrix payo¤s (4). Agent A chooses
whether to innovate or not for every possible choice of agent B, and vice-
versa.
Firm As best response
Agent A compares the payo¤ realized in outcome (1) and in outcome (3).
Innovating is a best response for A when B is not innovating i¤:
A = A1   A3 < 0: (23)
The previous inequality can be developed as:
pyA1 +y
A
1 p1   (q(eA1   S) + eq1) < 0; (24)
9See Sanin (2007) for further analysis on this issue.
10The previous discussion has one further implication: given that e¢ ciency in the per-
mits market does not depend on ; also welfare function becomes independent of . Hence,
in this setup environmental regulation should no longer be concerned with permits allo-
cation among agents.
Moreover, given the social benet from innovation, the role of the regulator to induce
the economy to settle at outcome (2) would be relevant, if possible. But notice that the
total amount of permits made available S has no role in the incentives to innovate. This is
the case because what makes the economy end up in outcome (2) or (1) is the interaction
between output demand and the level of productivity enhancement, both exogenous and
given for the regulator.
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where p = p1   p3, q = q1   q3, e = eA1   eA3 :
Then, after rearranging, the previous inequality becomes:
p
p1
+
mA
mA1
<
1
k
(
q1
p1
(2  2  e
A
3
eA1
)) +
q3
p1
(2  1)) (25)
where mA is the change in market share of agent A from outcome (1)
to outcome (3), i.e.11: mA = mA1  mA3 :
Firm A compares also the payo¤ realized in outcome (4) when the other
agent B is the only one innovating, with the one he would realize in outcome
(2), when both innovate. Innovating is a best response for A when B is
innovating i¤:
p
p2
+
mA
mA2
<
1
~k
(
q4
p2
(2(1  )  e
A
2
eA4
)  q2
p2
(1  2)) (26)
where p = p4   p2 and mA = mA4  mA2 :
Firm Bs best response
Agent B compares, on one hand, his payo¤ in outcome (4) versus outcome
(1) and, on the other hand, his payo¤ in outcome (3) versus outcome (2).
Given the symmetry of the rms the following conditions, are similar to
condition (25) and (26), respectively. In particular, rm B innovates when
rm A is not innovating i¤:
p
p1
+
mB
mB1
<
1
k
(
q1
p1
(2  e
B
4
eB1
)  q4
p1
(2  1)) (27)
where p = p1   p4 and mB = mB1  mB4 :
Instead, rm B innovates when rm A also innovates i¤:
p
p2
+
mB
mB2
<
1
~k
(
q3
p2
(2  e
B
2
eB3
)  q2
p2
(2  1)) (28)
11Condition (1) imposes a condition for innovation depending on the e¤ect that inno-
vation has on the output market revenue coming (i) from a change in output price; (ii)
on market sharepp1 +
mA
mA1
; and (iii) the change in the relative price of permits (as these
can either be used in the production of y or sold in the permitsmarket). The RHS of
inequality (1) is made of two elements: the rst qp1 (1  2) is the change in the relative
price of the permits as a cost,  < 12 , or a unit revenue,  >
1
2 , respectively when the rm
is a buyer or a seller of permits. The second component, q1p1 (1  
eA3
eA1
) is the relative price
weighted by the change of permits market position from (1) to (3).
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where p = p3   p2 and mB = mB3  mB2 :
Hence, the pair of strategies (Innovate, Innovate) is a NE equilibrium in
the rst stage game, if and only if equations (26) and (28) are both satised.
Notice that, which of these equations is more restrictive for reaching the
equilibrium depends, for a given ; on the relationship between prices across
outcomes. Then, it follows:
Proposition 4 If q4 < q2; outcome (2) INNOVATE-INNOVATE, is a NE
of the game i¤:
p4   p2
p2
+
mA4  mA2
mA2
<
1
~k
(
q4
p2
(2  e
A
2
eA4
)  q2
p2
(2  1));
while if q4 > q2;outcome (2) INNOVATE-INNOVATE, is a NE of the
game i¤:
p4   p2
p2
+
mA4  mA2
mA2
<
1
~k
(
q4
p2
(2  2  e
A
2
eA4
)  q2
p2
(1  2)):
Proof. See Appendix.
Similarly, the pair of strategies (Non Innovate, Non Innovate) is a NE
equilibrium in the rst stage game if and only if conditions (25) and (27)
hold with the reversed sign. Then, depending on to the relationship between
q1and q3 it follows:
Proposition 5 If q1 < q3 outcome (1) NOT INNOV-NOT INNOV is an
equilibrium of the game i¤
p1   p4
p1
+
mB1  mB4
mB1
>
1
k
(
q1
p1
(2  e
B
4
eB1
)  q4
p1
(2  1));
while if q1 > q3 outcome (1) is an equilibrium i¤
p1   p4
p1
+
mB1  mB4
mB1
>
1
k
(
q1
p1
(2  2  e
A
3
eA1
)  q3
p1
(1  2)):
Proof. See Appendix.
13
The uniqueness of the rst stage symmetric equilibrium Is it possi-
ble that both the pairs of strategies (Innovate, Innovate) and (Non Innovate,
Non Innovate) are simultaneously equilibria of the rst stage game?
Notice that the sets of parameters f; k; Sg where multiple equilibria
of the game could exist are dened by q1 > q3 = q4 > q2 if  < 12 ; or
q1 < q3 = q4 < q2 if  > 12 : The previous question can be answered studying
whether the following systems have a solution:8<:
p4 p2
p2
+
mA4  mA2
mA2
< 1
~k
( q4
p2
(2  eA2
eA4
)  q2
p2
(2  1))
p1 p4
p1
+
mB1  mB4
mB1
> 1
k
( q1
p1
(2  eB4
eB1
)  q4
p1
(2  1)) that arise from q1 <
q3 and q4 < q2; and8<:
p4 p2
p2
+
mA4  mA2
mA2
< 1
~k
( q4
p2
(2  2  eA2
eA4
)  q2
p2
(1  2))
p1 p4
p1
+
mB1  mB4
mB1
> 1
k
( q1
p1
(2  2  eA3
eA1
)  q3
p1
(1  2)) that arise from
q1 > q3 and q4 > q2:
Proposition 6 The two pairs of strategies (Innovate, Innovate) and (Not
innovate, not innovate) are mutually exclusive.
Proof. See Appendix.
The impossibility of asymmetric equilibria The question is whether it
is possible that B prefers outcome (3) to outcome (2) while A prefers outcome
(3) to outcome (1) making outcome (3) a possible rst stage NE. Given the
symmetry between outcome (3) and (4) proving this is the same as proving
that outcome (4) is never an equilibrium. The following proposition proves
this can never be the case:
Proposition 7 The rst stage game has no asymmetric equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
The previous propositions underlines the importance of the output market
characteristics and how such characteristics a¤ect the incentives to innovate
through the permits market exchange. In fact, the unit cost for the buyer
of permits, q (revenue for the seller), may be higher or lower depending
on output demands characteristics yielding di¤erent conditions required for
innovation to be the outcome of the game.
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Environmental regulation covers di¤erent sectors such as energy and trans-
port. Industries like electricity, for example, are often characterized by a well-
known inelastic demand (Sanin (2005)) while other sectors like ight trans-
port have a highly elastic demand. This paper emphasizes how industries
with di¤erent output markets characteristics may di¤er in their innovation
behavior.
3 Welfare considerations
This section is dedicated to study the welfare e¤ect of innovation. The econ-
omy is composed of two rms, as described in the above model, and con-
sumers that internalize emissions as a "bad" in their utility function U(S; y).
The equilibrium (Innovation, Innovation) Pareto dominates the equilib-
rium (Not innovate, Not innovate) if both rms have a higher prot in out-
come (2) than outcome (1) with at least one of them with a strictly higher
prot. The conditions under which this is the case can be obtained comparing
prots of each rm in outcome (1) and in outcome (2), i.e.:(
S(~k + k) = 4
6 1
S(~k + k) < 4(1 )
5 6
(29)
or (
S(~k + k) < 4
6 1
S(~k + k) = 4(1 )
5 6
: (30)
The investigation of the two systems yields that the innovation outcome
Pareto dominates the non innovation outcome if and only if innovation strictly
increases each rmprot. Indeed, innovation is a protable strategy for each
rm if the inequality S(~k + k) < 4
6 1 holds for rm A and the inequality
S(~k + k) < 4(1 )
5 6 holds for rm B. Given ; it is straightforward to check
that only one of these condition on S(~k+k) is binding, namely the condition
bearing on the permitsbuyer side12.
On the other hand, from direct comparison of the sum of prots in out-
come (1) and (2), it can be seen that the sum of prots in the innovation
12If  < 12 ; rm A is the buyer of permits and the binding condition is S(
~k + k) <
4
6 1 :While if  >
1
2 ; rm B is the buyer and the binding condition is S(
~k+k) < 4(1 )5 6 :
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outcome is higher than the sum of prots in the non-innovation outcome,
regardless of productivity enhancement13. Moreover, innovation is always
welfare improving from the consumers point of view as it implies an increase
in total output and a decrease in output price for a given level of pollution.
Hence, the question arises on how to induce rms to choose outcome (2)
instead of outcome (1) for every play.
One possible answer is allowing for collusion: given that the sum of prots
is strictly higher in outcome (2) it could be optimal for the rm that is better
o¤ after innovation to pay a compensation to the other rm instead of being
in outcome (1). Maximizing collusive prot M is as maximizing prots
of a single rm that produces total output y: Its prots after innovation are
M = (1 ~keM)~keM that yield the equilibrium level of emissions eM = 12~k :
When the cap over emissions is binding, i.e. 1
2~k
 S; the monopolist uses all
permits available S which implies that its price of output is pM = (1 ~kS);
as in the innovation outcome of the Cournot game. Then, collusion is welfare
enhancing if receiving half of the collusion prots is higher than the prots
that both, the buyer and the seller of permits receive in the non-innovation
outcome separately, namely,(
(1 ~kS)~kS
2
>

(1  kS)k S
2
  k(1  3
2
kS)(S
2
  S)
(1 ~kS)~kS
2
>

(1  kS)k S
2
  k(1  3
2
kS)(S
2
  (1  )S) ; (31)
Consider one of the possible combination of parameters that yield a non-
innovation equilibrium, i.e. S = 1;  = 0:1; ~k = 0:4; k = 0:38; and note
that these satisfy eM =
1
2~k
> S: For this combination of parameters both
inequalities in (31) are satised when  is such that 0:53 >  > 0:47: This
means that, for each combination of parameters that yield a non innovation
equilibrium there exists some level of  for which there is place for protable
compensation between rms to achieve the innovation outcome improving
welfare. More precisely, when the seller (buyer) does not have a strong long
(short) position, each of them is better o¤agreeing on innovating and dividing
collusion prots in halves than achieving the non-innovation outcome through
Cournot competition. Therefore, allowing for collusion is welfare improving
13The sum of prots in (2) is higher than the sum of prots in (1) if p1p2 <
~k
k that is if
~kS >
~k
k+~k
:Recall that the condition
~k k
2~k k < 
~kS is always satised for feasibility of this
model. This latter inequality is more restricting than ~kS >
~k
k+~k
:
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as rms are better o¤ without harming consumers14. It follows,
Proposition 8 When two Cournot players are also buyer or seller of the
input used to produce the output, there exists collusive equilibria that are
welfare improving
Finally, notice that there can be other equilibria where welfare improve-
ment from collusion is even stronger depending on the utility function of
consumers. This is the case when the cap on emissions is not binding for the
monopolist, i.e. eM =
1
2~k
< S leading to a higher level of environmental
quality. Let us assume a separable utility function of consumers where the
partial derivative with respect to S is bigger than the partial derivative with
respect to consumption of y: In this case there is a larger number of possible
welfare improving collusive equilibria.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the incentives for rms to invest in environmental
innovation. The decision to innovate is modelled as a sequential game of two
rms that compete à la Cournot in the output market. Payo¤s are composed
both from the revenue of the output market and from the revenue or cost
from the permits market. In fact, di¤erently from the existing literature, we
introduce the innovation game in a framework where both the output market
and the permits market are considered. Through the intra-market interaction
we establish a link between output demand, productivity enhancement due
to innovation, market structure and incentives to innovate.
The main result is that if two symmetric rms compete both in the output
and in the permits market, the new equilibrium is again symmetric; whether
in this new equilibrium rms innovate or not, depends mainly on the e¤ects
that innovation has on the cost of production and therefore on market power
in the output market (and on permits market revenue). Previous literature
nd that when innovation is not costly it is always undertaken as it provokes
a decrease in the unit cost of production (price of permits). On the contrary,
14Recall that when 1
2~k
 S; the monopolist uses all permits available S and that price
of output is pM = (1 ~kS); as in the innovation outcome of the Cournot game. Therefore,
consumers pay the same price of output under monopoly or under Cournot competition
as well as the same level of pollution S.
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we show that innovation can determine an increase in permitsprice, leading
to a higher cost of output production.
Moreover, most of the literature regarding market power claims that the
allocation of permits among rms has important e¢ ciency implications. Our
main contribution in this regard is that, under Cournot competition, the
allocation of permits among rms has no e¤ect neither on e¢ ciency nor on
incentives to innovate. In this strategic context, it is shown that innovation
incentives mainly depend on output demand and productivity enhancement
resulting from technological improvement.
From the policy makers view point, our main contribution is that the
allocation of permits among rms has no e¤ect neither on e¢ ciency nor on
incentives to innovate. In this sense we also show that, collusion may be
welfare improving.
The paper can be extended in several ways, for a start, end of pipe abate-
ment costs could be introduced to account for abatements cost reducing
innovation. Moreover, dynamics could be introduced in the decisions to in-
novate taking into account the interaction with the decision to bank permits
by the rms. Finally, the model in this paper could also be used to study the
incentives of incumbents to deter entry of new arrivals in the output market
through actions in the permits market.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Substituting ~k in (11) by ak with a 2 (1; 2) representing the productivity
enhacement.
Then, the derivative of (11) with respect to a is:
@q2
@a
=
@ak(1  3
2
akS)
@a
= k(1   3kSa) that can be possitive or negative.
Particularly, it is possitive for a set of values of f; k; Sg for which a < 1
3kS
:
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Since it is the case that eA = S  eB, the total output in outcome (3) can be
written as
yA + yB = ~kS   ~keB + keB = ~kS   eB(~k   k):
Output in outcome (1) instead is kS:
Then, output in (3) is higher than in (1) if ~kS eB(~k  k) > kS that
after rearranging becomes S > eB which is always true.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1: Recall condition (26) is
p
p2
+
mA
mA2
<
1
~k
(
q4
p2
(2(1  )  e
A
2
eA4
)  q2
p2
(1  2))
and that in equilibrium it is the case that: p3 = p4; q3 = q4; eA2 = e
B
2 ;m
B
3 =
mA4 ;m
B
2 = m
A
2 :
Then, substituting the previous inequalities in condition (28) for B, this
condition becomes:
p
p2
+
mA
mA2
<
1
~k
(
q4
p2
(2  e
A
2
eA4
)  q2
p2
(2  1)):
Then, condition (28) is more binding than condition in (26) if
1
~k
(
q4
p2
(2  2  e
A
2
eA4
)  q2
p2
(1  2)) > 1
~k
(
q4
p2
(2  e
A
2
eA4
)  q2
p2
(2  1))
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that after rearranging becomes a condition on the relationship among the
equilibrium price of permits and :
q4(
1
2
  ) > q2(1
2
  )
If  > (<)1
2
condition (28) is binding if q4 < (>)q2; otherwise condition
in (26) is binding.
Step 2:Then, for a given , wether q4 is higher or lower than q2 deter-
mines wich condition needs to be satised for having an INNOVATION-
INNOVATION equilibrium.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Step 1: Recall that condition (25) is not satied when
p
p1
+
mA1
mA1
>
1
k
(
q1
p1
(2(1  )  e
A
3
eA1
)  q3
p1
(1  2))
and that in equilibrium it is the case that p3 = p4; q3 = q4; eA2 = e
B
2 ;m
B
3 =
mA4 ;m
B
2 = m
A
2 :
Substituting the previous values in the condition of violation of (27) we
nd that the condition under wich it is optimal for B not to innovate is more
binding that the condition for wich it is optimal for A not innovate (violation
of (25)) if:
1
k
(
q1
p1
(2  e
B
4
eB1
)  q4
p1
(2  1)) > 1
k
(
q1
p1
(2(1  )  e
A
3
eA1
)  q3
p1
(1  2))
that after rearranging becomes a condition on the relationship among the
equilibrium price of permits and :
q4(  1
2
) > q1(  1
2
)
If  > (<)1
2
; violation of condition (27) is binding if q4 > (<)q1; otherwise
violation of condition (25) is binding.
Step 2:Then, for a given , wether q4 is higher or lower than q1 determines
wich condition needs to be satised for having an NON INNOVATION-NON
INNOVATION equilibrium.
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6.5 Proof of Proposition 5: Uniqueness
Step 1: Consider the system between the condition for the innovation equi-
librium to arrise and the condition for the non-innovation equilibrium:8<:
p4 p2
p2
+
mA4  mA2
mA2
< 1
~k
( q4
p2
(2  eA2
eA4
)  q2
p2
(2  1))
1
k
( q1
p1
(2  eB4
eB1
)  q4
p1
(2  1)) < p1 p4
p1
+
mB1  mB4
mB1
Step 2: We prove that both inequalities cannot be satised simultane-
ously.
We know that: p3 = p4; q3 = q4; eA2 = e
B
2 ;m
B
3 = m
A
4 ;m
B
2 = m
A
2
The rst inequality can be simplied as:
2~k(mA4  
1
2
) < (2  ~k)q4   q2
p2
  q4
p2
S
2eA4
+
q2
p2
where mA4 = (1 mB4 ) and eB4 = S   eA4 and therefore
2~k(
1
2
 mB4 ) < (2  ~k)
q4   q2
p2
  q4
p2
S
2eA4
+
q2
p2
(32)
Similarly, the second inequality can be rewriten as:
(2  k)q1   q4
p1
  q1
p1
(2  2e
A
4
S
) +
q4
p1
< 2k(
1
2
 mB4 ) (33)
As it is always the case that k < ~k, the LHS of (32) is higher than RHS
of (33).
Therefore, there is no multiple equilibria if the following inequality is
violated:
(2  k) (q1   q4)  q1(2  2e
A
4
S
) + q4

<
p1
p2

(2  ~k) (q4   q2)  q4 S2eA4 + q2

Substituting inside the previous q4 = 12
~kk(~k+k 3k~kS)
(~k2 ~kk+k2) ; e
A
4 =
k ~k ~kkS+2~k2S
2(~k2 ~kk+k2) ;
q2 = ~k(1  32~kS); q1 = k(1  32kS)
and taking into account that p = 1   y we show that proving that the
previous inequality is violated simply means proving the following positive:
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
k   ~k
2
0BBBBBBB@
6k   21~kk   2~k2 + 13~k3   27~k4+
18~k5   13k2
+9k4 + 43~kk2 + 29~k2k   3~kk3 
30~k3k   18~kk4 + 36~k4k
 18~k5k   60~k2k2 + 18~k2k3 + 36~k3k2
+9~k2k4   9~k3k3   9~k4k2
1CCCCCCCA

~k   k + ~kk   2~k2

~k2   ~kk + k2

~k   1
 > 0 (34)
Now we study the sign of each of the functions in (34):
1.
~k   k + ~kk   2~k2 < 0
Lets call ~k = ak. For di¤erent values of a 2 (1; 2) the previous function
is positive or negative depending on the value of k (see graph):
0 . 6 2 50 . 50 . 3 7 50 . 2 50 . 1 2 50
0
- 0 . 2 5
- 0 . 5
- 0 . 7 5
- 1
x
y
But in the admissible set of parameters dened by the condition on pos-
itivity of emmisions S~k > ~k k
2~k k the previous function is always negative.
When the denominator of emmissions of B in outcome (3) (or emissions of A
in outcome (4)) and the previous function ~k   k + ~kk   2~k2) is positive the
function ~k   k + ~kk   2~k2 is negative (see graph):
0 . 6 2 50 . 50 . 3 7 50 . 2 50 . 1 2 50
0 . 5
0 . 2 5
0
- 0 . 2 5
- 0 . 5
x
y
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2. 0BBBBBBB@
6k   21~kk   2~k2 + 13~k3   27~k4
+18~k5   13k2 + 9k4 + 43~kk2
+29~k2k   3~kk3   30~k3k   18~kk4
+36~k4k   18~k5k 
60~k2k2 + 18~k2k3 + 36~k3k2
+9~k2k4   9~k3k3   9~k4k2
1CCCCCCCA
> 0
Lets call again ~k = ak. For di¤erent values of a 2 (1; 2) the previous
function is always possitive in the admissible set of parameters (see graph):
0 . 6 2 50 . 50 . 3 7 50 . 2 50 . 1 2 50
2
1 . 5
1
0 . 5
0
x
y
3.
1
6

k   ~k
2
~k2   ~kk + k2

~k   1
 < 0 (35)
As ~k2 > ~kk this function is negative due to the negative component
(~k   1). It is the case that ~k < 1 to ensure that output price p2 = 1   ~kS
is possitive as for this proof we take  = 1; S = 1:
Hence, (34) is satised meaning we have a unique equilibriun in the ad-
missible set of ; k; ~k; S:
Step 3: The incompatibility of the following system can be proven follow-
ing the previous reasoning:8<:
p4 p2
p2
+
mA4  mA2
mA2
< 1
~k
( q4
p2
(2  2  eA2
eA4
)  q2
p2
(1  2))
p1 p4
p1
+
mB1  mB4
mB1
> 1
k
( q1
p1
(2  2  eA3
eA1
)  q3
p1
(1  2))
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6.6 Proof of Proposition 6: Imposibility of asymmetric
equilibria
Could it be the case that, at the same time preference between possible
outcomes of the game satisfy15 (3) B (2) and (3) A (1)?
Recall condition (25) that ensures (3) A (1) :
p1   p3
p1
+
mA1  mA3
mA1
<
1
k
(
q1
p1
(2(1  )  e
A
3
eA1
)  q3
p1
(1  2))
While the condition that ensures (3) B (2) is condition (28) with the
reverse sign:
p4   p2
p2
+
mA4  mA2
mA2
>
1
~k
(
q4
p2
(2  e
A
2
eA4
)  q2
p2
(2  1))
If the previous two inequalities are satised simultaneously there exists
an asymetric equilibria. Then, after rearranging the system becomes:8<: 2k(1 m
A
3 ) <
1
p1

q1(2(1  )  e
A
3
eA1
)  q3(1  2) + p3k

2~kmA3 <
1
p2

q3(
eA1
eB3
  2) + q2(2  1) + p3~k

where mA3 >
1
2
and k < ~k.
Then, the LHS of the rst inequality in the system is lower than LHS of
the second inequality meaning that they are satised simultaneously if:
2kmB3 < 2
~kmA3 <
1
p2

q3(
eA1
eB3
  2) + q2(2  1) + p3~k

Then, for nding the set of parameters for which an assymetric equilibria
is not possible we must nd the parameters for wich the following inequality
is true:
2kmB3  
1
p2
 
q3(
S
2
eB3
  2) + q2(2  1) + p3~k
!
> 0 (36)
Substituting equilibrium values: q3 = 12
~kk(~k+k 3k~kS)
(~k2 ~kk+k2) ; q2 = 
~k(1  3
2
~kS);
eB3 =
k ~k ~kkS+2~k2S
2(~k2 ~kk+k2)
15By symetry, this question is the same as asking both (4) A (2)) and (4) B (1)) to
be satised simultaneously.
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and valuating in admissible values condition (36) becomes:

 1
6


k   ~k

0BBBBBBBBB@
~k5 + ~k6   6~k7   12k5 + 23~kk4 
2~k4k + 39~kk5   11~k5k + 22~k6k 
6~k7k   22~k2k3 + 12~k3k2   93~k2k4
+74~k3k3   34~k4k2   42~k2k5
+145~k3k4   120~k4k3+
63~k5k2 + 3~k3k5   63~k4k4
+57~k5k3   45~k6k2
1CCCCCCCCCA

~k2   2~kk + k2 + ~kk2 + ~k2k

~k2   ~kk + k2

~k   k + ~kk   2~k2

~k   1
 > 0 (37)
Now we study the sign of the functions in (37):
1. Given that we assumed  = S = 1; (~k   1) < 0
2.  1
6
< 0
3.

~k2   ~kk + k2

> 0 as ~k2 > ~kk
4. ~k   k + ~kk   2~k2 < 0 already studied in the previous proof: always
negative in the admisible set of parameters.
5. 0BBBBB@
~k5 + ~k6   6~k7   12k5 + 23~kk4   2~k4k + 39~kk5
 11~k5k + 22~k6k   6~k7k   22~k2k3
+12~k3k2   93~k2k4 + 74~k3k3   34~k4k2
 42~k2k5 + 145~k3k4   120~k4k3 + 63~k5k2
+3~k3k5   63~k4k4 + 57~k5k3   45~k6k2
1CCCCCA < 0
Taking ~k = ak, the previous function is always negative for di¤erent values
of a 2 (1; 2) (see graph):
10 . 7 50 . 50 . 2 50
1 0
5
0
- 5
- 1 0
x
y
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6.

~k2   2~kk + k2 + ~kk2 + ~k2k

> 0
Again taking ~k = ak the previous function mapped for di¤erent values of
a 2 (1; 2) is always positive (see graph).
10 . 7 50 . 50 . 2 50
2
1
0
- 1
- 2
x
y
Hence, the sign of the overall function is positive meaning that there is no
possible asymetric equilibria in the admisible set of ; k,~k; S: Then, we have
proved that the symmetric equilibria are unique.
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